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In other words, noth ing would en dan ger the law more than the pos si bil ity of its au thor ity be ing contested by a vi o lence over which it has no con trol. The func tion of the law would there fore be, first and fore most, to con tain vi o lence within its own bound aries. It is in this con text that, to dem on strate this sur pris ing hy poth e sis, Ben ja min in vokes two ex am ples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war.
Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within class strug le. To be gin with, the very idea of such a strug le implies cer tain forms of vi o lence. The strike could then be un der stood as one of the rec og niz able forms that this vi o lence can take. However, this an a lyt i cal frame work is undermined as soon as this form of vi o lence be comes reg u lated by a "right to strike," such as the one rec og nized by law in France in 1864. What this rec og ni tion en gages is, in fact, the will of the state to con trol the pos si ble "vi o lence" of the strike. Thus, the "right" of the right to strike ap pears as the best, if not the only, way for the state to cir cum scribe within (and via) the law the rel a tive vi o lence of class strug les. We might con sider this to be the per fect il lus tra tion of the afore men tioned hy poth e sis. Yet, there are two lines of ques tioning that de sta bi lize this hy poth e sis that we would do well to con sid er.
First, is it le git i mate to pres ent the strike as a form of vi o lence? Who has a vested in ter est in such a rep re sen ta tion? In other words, how can we trace a clear and un equiv o cal de mar ca tion be tween vi o lence and non vi o lence? Are we not al ways bound to find res i dues of vi o lence, even in those ac tions that we would be tempted to con sider non vi o lent? The sec ond line of questioning is just as im por tant and is rooted in the dis tinc tion established by Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, be tween the "po lit i cal strike" and the "pro le tar ian gen eral strike," to which Ben ja min ded i cates a set of com ple men tary an a ly ses in §13 of his es say. Here, again, we are faced with a ques tion of lim its. What is at stake is the pos si bil ity for a cer tain type of strike (the pro le tar ian gen eral strike) to ex ceed the lim its of the right to striketurn ing, in other words, the right to strike against the law itself. The phe nom e non is that of an au to im mune pro cess, in which the right to strike that is meant to pro tect the law against the pos si ble vi o lence of class strug les is transformed into a means for the de struc tion of the law. The dif er ence be tween the two types of strikes is nev er the less in tro duced with a con di tion: "The validity of this state ment, how ev er, is not un re stricted be cause it is not un con di tion al," notes Ben ja min in §7. We would be mis taken in be liev ing that the right to strike is granted and guaranteed un con di tion al ly. Rather, it is struc tur ally subjected to a con flict of in ter pre ta tions, those of the work ers, on the one hand, and of the state on the oth er. From the point of view of the state, the par tial strike can not un der any cir cum stance be un der stood as a right to ex er cise vi o lence, but rather as the right to ex tract one self from a preexisting (and ver i fi able) vi o lence: that of the em ployer. In this sense, the par tial strike should be con sid ered a non vi o lent ac tion, what Ben ja min named a "pure means."
The in ter pre ta tions di verge on two main points. The first clearly de pends on the al leged "vi o lence of the em ployer," a pred i cate that begs the ques tion: Who might have the au thor ity to rec og nize such vi o lence? Evidently it is not the em ployer. The dan ger is that the state would sim i larly lack the in cen tive to make such a judg ment call. It is nearly im pos si ble, in fact, to find a sin gle in stance of a strike in which this rec og ni tion of vi o lence was not sub ject to con sid er able con tro ver sy. The po lit i cal game is thus the fol low ing: the state legislated the right to strike in or der to con tain class strug les, with the con di tion that work ers must have "good rea son" to strike. However, it is un likely that a state sys tem at i cally al lied with (and ac com plice to) em ployers will ever rec og nize rea sons as good, and, as a con se quence, it will deem any in vo ca tion of the right to strike as il le git i mate. Workers will there fore be seen as abus ing a right granted by the state, and in so do ing transforming it into a vi o lent means. On this point, Ben ja min's an a ly ses re main ex tremely per ti nent and pro foundly con tem po rary. They un veil the en dur ing strat egy of gov ern ments confronted with a strike (in ed u ca tion, transportation, or healthcare, for ex am ple) who, af er claiming to un der stand the rea sons for the pro test and the griev ances of the work ers, deny that the ar gu ments con sti tute suf cient rea son for a strike that will likely par a lyze this or that sec tor of the econ o my. They de ny, in other words, that the con di tions de nounced by the work ers dis play an in trin sic vi o lence that jus tifies the strike. Let us note here a point that Ben ja min does not men tion, but that is part of Sorel's re flec tions: this de nial in ev i ta bly con tam i na tes the (so cial ist) lef once it gains pow er. What might pre vi ously have seemed a good rea son to strike when it was the op po si tion is deemed an in suf cient one once it is the rul ing par ty. In the face of pop u lar pro test, it al ways in vokes a lack of suf cient ra tio nale, allow ing it to avoid rec og niz ing the in trin sic vi o lence of a given so cial or eco nomic sit u a tion, or of a new pol i cy. And it is be cause it re fuses to see this vi o lence and to take re spon si bil ity for it that the lef reg u larly loses work ers' sup port.
The sec ond con flict of in ter pre ta tion con cerns what is at stake in the strike. For the state, the strike implies a with drawal or act of de fi ance visàvis the em ployer, while for the work ers it is a means of pres sur ing, if not of black mail or even of "hos tage tak ing." The dif er ence is thus be tween an act of sus pen sion (which can be con sid ered non vi o lent) and one of ex tor tion (which includes vi o lence). Does this mean that "pure means" are not free of am bi gu i ty, and that there can be no non vi o lent ac tion that does not in clude a res i due of vi o lence? It is not clear that Ben ja min's text al lows us to go this far. Nevertheless, the prob lem of pure means, approached through the no tion of the right to strike, raises the fol low ing ques tion: Could it be that the text "Zur Kritik der Gewalt," which we are ac cus tomed to read ing as a text on vi o lence, deals in fact with the pos si bil ity and am bi gu ity of non vi o lence?
The op po si tion be tween the afore men tioned con flicts of in ter pre ta tion man i fests itself in Ben ja min's ex cur sus on the rev o lu tion ary strike, and spe cifi cally in the op po si tion be tween the po lit i cal strike and the pro le tar ian gen eral strike, and in the mean ing we should at tri bute to the lat ter. As pre vi ously discussed, the state will never ad mit that the right to strike is a right to vi o lence. Its in ter pre ta tive strat egy con sists in de ny ing, as much as pos si ble, the ef ec tive ex er cise of the right that it the o ret i cally grants. Under these con di tions, the func tion of the rev o lu tion ary strike is to return the strike to its true mean ing; in other words, to return it to its own vi o lence. In this con text, the im per a tive is to move be yond idle words: a call to strike is a call to vi o lence. This is the rea son why such a call is reg u larly met with a vi o lent re ac tion from the state, be cause trade unions force the state to rec og nize what it is try ing to ig nore, what it pre tends to have solved by rec og niz ing the right to strike: the ir re duc ible vi o lence of class strug les. This means that the pre vi ously discussed al ter na tive be tween "sus pen sion" and "ex tor tion" is valid only for the po lit i cal strike-in other words, for a strike whose pri mary vo ca tion is not, con trary to that of the pro le tar ian gen eral strike, to re volt against the law itself. Essentially, the idea of a pro le tar ian gen eral strike, its myth (to bor row Sorel's words), is to es cape from this di chot o mous al ter na tive that in ev i ta bly re pro duces and per pet u ates the vi o lence of dom i na tion.
Let us con sider one fi nal point in Ben ja min's re flec tion, which con cerns the cru cial prob lem of des ig na tion. The fun da men tal ques tion is that of know ing what we can and should call vi o lence:
For, how ever par a dox i cal it may seem on first glance, even con duct un der taken in the ex er cise of a right can be de scribed un der cer tain con di tions as vi o lence. And in deed such con duct, when it is ac tive, can be called vi o lence if it ex er cises a right that is vested in it by the power of the le gal or der in or der to top ple that very or der. When pas sive, how ev er, it is none the less to be de scribed as vi o lence if it con sti tutes ex tor tion in the sense de vel oped above. ( §7) Three ques tions emerge from the des ig na tion of an ac tion as vi o lent. The first is how to un der stand what is at stake. What forces are en gaged when "we" (who, in fact?) de scribe an ac tion as vi o lent? The sec ond asks what the idea of the pro le tar ian gen eral strike teaches us re gard ing the spe cific func tion of vi o lence-"to found or trans form le gal re la tions." Finally, the third prob lem re quires us to ex am ine what it means to rec og nize vi o lence in an ac tion that we would be tempted to con sider non vi o lent. These three ques tions re mind us that nam ing vi o lence is not only an ex er cise of pow er, but that it is al ways, in itself, the lo cus of a power strug le.
II
One would be hard pressed to find a writer who was more con scious of the power strug le at play in the act of nam ing vi o lence than Georges Sorel. Let us briefly turn away from Ben ja min and to ward Sorel's Reflections on Violence (1907) , which was a source of ma jor in spi ra tion for Ben ja min's "Zur Kritik der Gewalt." For Sorel, so cial ism is mean ing less un less it sets as its prom ise the eman ci pa tion of the work ing class from all sit u a tions of dom i na tion-in other words, un less its goal is one of cre at ing a so ci ety freed from all re la tions be tween mas ters and slaves. Thus, the fol low ing ques tion emerges: What needs must we sat isfy such that so cial ist eman ci pa tion is not revealed to be a mere il lu sion? For Sorel, cri tiqu ing the mas ters of the day is not suf cient pre cau tion. We must pro tect our selves from the mas ters of the fu ture. This is why, as we will see, the po lit i cal strike-the strike un der stood as an ex tor tion, whose aim is to com pro mise with the mas ters of the time-is situated in op po si tion to such a rad i cal prom ise of lib er a tion, and con sti tutes, as a con se quence, a be tray al. Herein lies the dif culty of so cial ism: ev ery time we think (or hope) to have got ten rid of the fig ure of the mas ter, one way or an other he or she finds his or her way back.
Accordingly, we come to un der stand the prob lem as the fol low ing: How can we safe guard the prom ise, inscribed within a pro ject of rad i cal elim i na tion of mas ters that would ipso facto com pro mise it? For Sorel, this need could not be se cured as long as the so cial ists aimed to con quer power through le gal means (in other words, dem o crat i cally and non vi o lent ly). Their com pro mises with cap i tal ism, their ar range ments, and their weaknesses were noth ing more than a way of mak ing them selves ac cept able to the mas ters of their time as pos si ble mas ters of the fu ture. Is it not in these terms that we should un der stand their fas ci na tion with state power and gov ern men tal in sti tu tions? With this anal y sis, Sorel ap proaches Friedrich Nietzsche's cri tique of the links be tween so cial ism and parliamentarism, for mu lated some twenty years ear li er. They both con demn, for dis pa rate rea sons but with re mark ably sim i lar ter mi nol o gy, the il lu sory emancipatory char ac ter of such links. Far from trusting a pro ject of eman ci pa tion through le gal means, Sorel ar gues for the need to dis tin guish two rad i cally dif er ent forms of po lit i cal ac tion. The first, par lia men ta ry, one op ti mis ti cally be lieves that a con tin u ous path to ward so cial prog ress can be traced through le gal re forms. The sec ond, on the other hand, might be un der stood as a "pes si mis tic path" lead ing to ward a nec es sar ily di sas trous "de liv er ance." The for mer as serts that there is no means of eman ci pat ing the peo ple other than the le gal con quest of power through dem o cratic elec tions, while the lat ter places all hope in the prom ises of a gen eral rev o lu tion ary strike. Building on this ba sic dis tinc tion, Sorel's pro ject con sists of show ing that the sec ond way is not only cred i ble, but also mor al-suf ciently moral for him to de fine this pes si mis tic "march to wards de liv er ance" as a "meta phys ics of mor als." 2 This de ci sive dis tinc tion be tween op ti mism and pes si mism, and be tween re form and rev o lu tion, de mands two fur ther con sid er ations. First, the dis tinc tion rests on two dif er ent at ti tudes with regard to the state. The first (so cial ist) one might be called the "su per sti tion of the state," al though Ben ja min would un doubt edly speak of the "su per sti tion of the law." In this ap proach, hav ing gained power through le gal means, laws and state in sti tu tions are reinforced in or der to jus tify and ren der ac cept able re forms that con tra dict the ini tial prom ises of those who as sumed pow er. It strives to re as sure the mas ters (the dom i nant class) by show ing them that they have noth ing to fear for their in ter ests, while ask ing the sub al tern masses to wait. Consequently, the ex pound ers of this su per sti tion re fuse all forms of vi o lence that are not le git i mized and or ga nized by the state. The pres er va tion of the state is thus fa vored over the eman ci pa tion of the work ing class, while the prom ise of a so ci ety lib er ated from mas ter-slave re la tions is substituted by a de sire for their mu tual peace. Inversely, rev o lu tion ary syn di cal ism, far from want ing to seize the state and its means, wishes only to rad i cally over throw it.
The sec ond con sid er ation is that Sorel's cri tique of the ideology of the pres er va tion and con ser va tion of the state con fers a new mean ing to the no tion of class strug le. It con sti tutes pre cisely that which re form ist so cial ism tries to avoid or move be yond. Under the pre text of so cial peace, this form of so cial ism seeks noth ing more than a com pro mise, a pact with the bour geoi sie that will not change in the least the bal ance of power in so ci e ty. Thus, so cial peace is sus pect and un trust wor thy, be cause for the sake of such a peace, bound by du ty, dis ci pline, and si lence, the mas ters will al ways re main the same. In this sense, so cial peace is linked to an impounding of speech, a con fis ca tion of the voice that cor re sponds to the con fis ca tion of all hope for a fu ture de liv er ance. Hence Sorel's cen tral ques tion: Which voice, one shared rather than dom i nant, could carry such a hope? We must, in other words, find a word-or, more ex act ly, the true im age of an ac tion-ca pa ble of car ry ing the de liv er ance. If such an im age were to ex ist, it would need to be re sis tant to ap pro pri a tion by the dom i nant class, and it should have no other aim than to over throw dom i na tion. Sorel calls it a "myth" to dis tin guish it from a uto pia, a myth that can be crit i cized for of er ing the false and il lu sory im age of an "enchanted" so ci ety to come.
Thus, we ar rive at the core of the ar gu ment: for Sorel the rev o lu tion ary gen eral strike is a myth, one that should be un der stood as the im age of the ac tion nec es sary to eman ci pate the work ing class. It is the im age of a rup ture with his toric time, and it is this that marks its fun da men tal dif er ence from a uto pia. The lat ter, with its pro gram of rid ding so ci ety of all its ills, in fact en ters into a con tract with its own her i tage in or der to ac com mo date the pres sures of its his tor i cal ep och. Conversely, the myth wants noth ing to do with the past; marked by a rad i cal dis con ti nu ity, it does not ex press any in ter est in eco nom ic, so cio log i cal, or his tor i cal da ta. The myth fully identifies with the rup ture that it im poses by fulfilling three main needs: (1) to find a word for the fu ture, one whose es cha to log i cal di men sion is not threat ened by sci en tific dis cus sions; (2) to in vent a word whose con sid er ation is not sub jected to the con di tion of its fea si bil i ty, nor of its prob a ble or pos si ble ef ects; and (3) to pres ent an im age of a rad i cal class strug le that would abol ish all con fu sion be tween fields-in other words, an im age that would erase all risk of a par a dox i cal re in force ment of dom i na tion and would, rath er, pre cip i tate its un do ing. This is, then, the func tion of the pro le tar ian gen eral strike: it is a myth whose strength lies in its dual char ac ter. On the one hand, the myth is meant to unite the work ing class, with out re quir ing any sub mis sion in return. It im poses itself with out tak ing the shape of a com mand uttered by an or ga ni za tion or a par ty. On the other hand, it im me di ately ex poses the in suf ciency of the re forms pro posed by the sys tem, unveiling the abyss that sep a rates rev o lu tion ary hope from all forms of com pro mise. Such a myth can not ac com mo date any pres er va tion or con ser va tion of the law. The re sult is the jus ti fi ca tion of vi o lence that con sti tutes one of the most dis tinc tive traits of Sorel's thought. Nothing can hap pen with out vi o lence, as a pol i tics that tries to con tain vi o lence will be un able to re spond to the myth i cal im per a tive of un do ing all dom i na tion. This is, ul ti mate ly, the ter ri ble (and ter ri fy ing) law of the myth: there can be no sal va tion with out a vi o lent over throw of the cur rent state of af airs.
III
Let us return to Ben ja min and, spe cifi cal ly, to the sec ond ex am ple he con sid ers in the sub se quent par a graph of his es say: the ques tion of the law of war. Two as pects re tain Ben ja min's at ten tion. The first one is the way in which the law of war con sists in noth ing other than the in scrip tion of war's vi o lence within the lim its of the law. As a con se quence, war be comes a form of vi o lence ca pa ble of law mak ing. When en ter ing into a war, peo ple give them selves a new law to sanc tion nat u ral ends. What mat ters, then, is the po ten tial con flict or con tra dic tion be tween these nat u ral ends and other ends, ei ther nat u ral of le gal, be gin ning with the pro hi bi tion of mur der. War is first and fore most a per mis sion to kill, and it this same license that the law of war in scribes in the le gal sys tem. It is un doubt edly a con di tional per mis sion to kill, just as the right to strike was con di tion al, and the whole strat egy of the gov ern ment con sists in ren der ing it ac cept able, or even in portraying it as nec es sary.
Nevertheless, sanc tion ing war in ev i ta bly also means sanc tion ing the risk of los ing one's life, or of see ing the peo ple we love dis ap pear. This is the rea son that con flict does not merely op pose nat u ral to le gal ends, but also dif er ent nat u ral ends to each oth er. No war can claim a uni ver sal fi nal i ty. Its in ter ests are al ways par tic u lar. And this is the rea son why it is al ways nat u ral ends that guide the de ci sion to en ter into a war, while other ends are weak ened, be gin ning with the pro tec tion of hu man life, our own as well as that of our loved ones. Two ex am ples will al low us to il lus trate this point. They are not taken from Ben ja min's es say but date back to the same his tor i cal pe ri od. The first one, a quote from Romain Rolland's novel Clérambault (1920) , is a charge against war, writ ten by the man who was soon to be come the most em i nent voice of Eu ro pean pac i fism. He de nounces war as the mech a nism that trans forms fa thers into the mur der ers of their own sons. The con flict presented is one be tween pro tec tion from death-an as sumed nat u ral role of par ents in regard to their chil dren-and ex po sure to vi o lent death, re quired by the war and its im per a tives of pa tri ot ism, sac ri fice, and so on. The sec ond ex am ple con cerns mourn ing. Although it is nat u ral to mourn our loved ones, in times of war it is con sid ered in de cent to overtly ex press one's grief when a sol dier is hon or ably killed on the bat tle field. The only le git i mate feel ing is one of tak ing pride in his sac ri fice. Let us read the words of Romain Rolland: I had a son whom I loved, and sent to his death. You Fathers of mourn ing Europe, mil li ons of fa thers, widowed of your sons, en e mies or friends, I do not speak for my self only, but for you who are stained with their blood even as I am. You all speak by the voice of one of you,-my un happy voice full of sor row and re pen tance.
My son died, for yours, by yours.-How can I tell?-like yours. I laid the blame on the en e my, and on the war, as you must also have done, but I see now that the chief crim i nal, the one whom I ac cuse, is my self. Yes, I am guilty; and that means you, and all of us. You must lis ten while I tell you what you know well enough, but do not want to hear. 3 Ben ja min's par a graph con cerns not only the law of war but also of peace and, more pre cise ly, the con di tions of peace. First, it is use ful to evoke the his tor i cal con text of the pas sage, which is that of the Treaty of Versailles. Like many oth ers (no ta bly, Rolland), Ben ja min entertained no il lu sions re gard ing this trea ty. He knew that it was not founded upon a tran scen dent prin ci ple, as, for ex am ple, a prin ci ple of jus tice. Two fur ther points de serve to be men tioned. First, the treaty be longs to the long tra di tion of rit u als purporting to end the war. Second, ev ery vic tory al ways implies that the los ing party suf ers a pred a tory vi o lence. As a con se quence, peace treaties have no other func tion than that of inscribing and le git i miz ing this vi o lence within the bound aries of the law, just as the right to strike had the func tion of circumscribing the vi o lence of class strug les. Treaties turn vi o lence into law; their only func tion is to es tab lish the law of the win ners. One can only draw the ter ri ble con clu sion that peace treaties have no other vo ca tion than that of inscribing the vi o lence of the vic tory within the law. Thus, we ar rive at the es sen tial in ter est of Ben ja min's par a graph: it con sists, par a dig mat i cal ly, of extending his con clu sion to all vi o lence per pe trated for the sat is fac tion of nat u ral ends. Benjamin writes: "If a con clu sion may be drawn from con sid er ing mil i tary vi o lence as an orig i nal and ar che typal form of vi o lence, it would be that there inheres by a lawpos it ing [rechtsetzender] char ac ter in all vi o lence used for nat u ral ends" ( §8).
To con clude, let us com ment on the fi nal lines of Ben ja min's par a graph: "The state, how ev er, fears this vi o lence ev ery where for its lawpos it ing char ac ter, just as it must rec og nize vi o lence as lawpos it ing when ever for eign pow ers [auswärtige Mächte] com pel it to con cede the right to war, and clas ses the right to strike" ( §8). First, the state is de fined via its re la tion ship to two hos tile forces. Ben ja min does not talk of en e mies, as Carl Schmitt does dur ing the same pe ri od, but we are not very far from a Schmittian con cep tion of the state. Furthermore, what de fi nes this en emy is its law mak ing abil i ty. For the state, the en emy is the one who is will ing to es tab lish a new law. Finally, the state distinguishes itself by a cer tain pas siv i ty, if not an ac tual weak ness. The state "fears" and is "forced" to con cede. From this per spec tive it is dif cult to ig nore that this is pre cisely what Ben ja min was reproached for by those gravediger think ers of the Weimar Republic. But that is a whole other sto ry.
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